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Research in lightness perception centers on understanding the prior assumptions and
processing strategies the visual system uses to parse the retinal intensity distribution
(the proximal stimulus) into the surface reflectance and illumination components of
the scene (the distal stimulus—ground truth). It is agreed that the visual system must
compare different regions of the visual image to solve this inverse problem; however, the
nature of the comparisons and the mechanisms underlying them are topics of intense
debate. Perceptual illusions are of value because they reveal important information
about these visual processing mechanisms. We propose a framework for lightness
research that resolves confusions and paradoxes in the literature, and provides insight
into the mechanisms the visual system employs to tackle the inverse problem. The
main idea is that much of the debate and confusion in the literature stems from the
fact that lightness, defined as apparent reflectance, is underspecified and refers to
three different types of judgments that are not comparable. Under stimulus conditions
containing a visible illumination component, such as a shadow boundary, observers can
distinguish andmatch three independent dimensions of achromatic experience: apparent
intensity (brightness), apparent local intensity ratio (brightness-contrast), and apparent
reflectance (lightness). In the absence of a visible illumination boundary, however,
achromatic vision reduces to two dimensions and, depending on stimulus conditions and
observer instructions, judgments of lightness are identical to judgments of brightness or
brightness-contrast. Furthermore, because lightness judgments are based on different
information under different conditions, they can differ greatly in their degree of difficulty
and in their accuracy. This may, in part, explain the large variability in lightness constancy
across studies.
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Introduction
A central question in the study of human visual perception is how and under what circumstances
the visual system is able to separate the physically invariant reflectance of a surface R(x, y) from
its potentially changing illumination I(x, y). The visual system does not have direct access to either
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reflectance (R) or illumination (I) but only to their product which
determines the luminance (intensity) distribution falling on the
photoreceptor array: L(x, y) = I(x, y) • R(x, y). The indepen-
dent recovery of surface reflectance R(x, y) and illumination I(x,
y) is thus an ill-posed (inverse) problem in that there are innu-
merable combinations of these two variables that can give rise to
any particular intensity distribution, and in the absence of addi-
tional information it is impossible to uniquely recover the physi-
cally correct solution. Current research centers on understanding
the prior assumptions and processing strategies the visual sys-
tem uses to parse (correctly or incorrectly) the retinal intensity
distribution (the proximal stimulus) into the surface reflectance
and illumination components of the scene (the distal stimulus—
ground truth). It is generally agreed that the visual system must
compare different regions of the visual image in its attempt to
solve or approximately solve this problem; however, the nature
of these comparisons and the mechanisms underlying them are
topics of intense debate. Perceptual illusions are of value in this
regard because they reveal important information about these
underlying visual processing mechanisms.
The debate concerning the mechanisms underlying the per-
ceptual correlates of the physical components of the visual stim-
ulus, i.e., apparent intensity (brightness), apparent reflectance
(lightness), and apparent illumination, is historically longstand-
ing and well-illustrated by the illusion variously referred to as
simultaneous brightness (or lightness) contrast (Figure 1). Note
that the different names for this illusion (as well as the differ-
ent adjectives used to describe it) reflect the historical contro-
versy concerning its cause, i.e., whether the illusion is one of
apparent intensity (brightness) or apparent reflectance (light-
ness). In an attempt to avoid confusion, or the erroneous impres-
sion that these names refer to different illusions, we use the term
simultaneous contrast and describe the illusion using both the
descriptors used to refer to the dimensions of apparent inten-
sity (brightness, ranging from dim to bright), and apparent
reflectance (lightness, ranging from black to white). Accordingly,
simultaneous contrast can be described as an illusion in which
a mid-intensity (gray) test patch on a dim (black) background
looks brighter (whiter) than an identical test patch on a bright
(white) background (Figure 1A).
Nearly 150 years ago Mach (1865, in Ratliff, 1965) and
Hering (1874/1964) advocated what has come to be called a
FIGURE 1 | Simultaneous contrast stimulus. (A) Illustration of a reflectance
edge and (B) an illumination edge simultaneous brightness/lightness contrast
stimulus. In (A, B) all of the test patches have the same luminance. The low
luminance and high luminance backgrounds are also equivalent in the two
stimuli. Stimulus (A, B) differ only in the addition of a far surround to three
sides of the high luminance background in (B) to simulate an illumination edge.
“low-level” account of simultaneous contrast based on reciprocal
interactions between elements in the nervous system. This view
was later represented by early models of lateral inhibitory inter-
actions such as those performed by the center-surround recep-
tive fields of neurons in the retina and lateral geniculate nucleus
(LGN) of cats and primates (for reviews see: Heinemann, 1972;
Jameson and Hurvich, 1989; Kingdom and Moulden, 1989;
Fiorentini et al., 1990; Kingdom, 1997, 2003, 2011, 2013; Fioren-
tini, 2003) and is today represented by modern multiscale filter-
ing models such as the ODOG model (Blakeslee and McCourt,
1999; Robinson et al., 2007), as well as by models positing
the filling-in (Grossberg and Todorovic, 1988; Rossi and Par-
adiso, 2003) of the representation of a test patch by informa-
tion extracted by relatively high-frequency filters (small receptive
fields) at the edges of the patch or at multiple edges within the
stimulus (Rudd, 2010, 2013, 2014).
von Helmholtz (1866/1962), on the other hand, emphasized
the importance of “unconscious inference” in producing the
simultaneous contrast effect. According to Helmholtz observers
interpret the test patch on the bright (white) background to
be under a higher level of illumination than the equilumi-
nant test patch on the dim (black) background. Since the mid-
intensity (gray) test patches reflect the same amount of light
to the eye, Helmholtz proposed that the visual system “uncon-
sciously infers” that the more highly illuminated test patch is
less reflective resulting in its appearance as dimmer (or a darker
shade of gray). This relatively “high-level” account is often revis-
ited in current explanations in which a variety of “mid-level”
factors such as junctions (Adelson, 2000) or Gestalt grouping
(Gilchrist et al., 1999; Gilchrist, 2006), lead to perceptual infer-
ences about depth, illumination, reflectance, and transparency
(Gilchrist et al., 1999; Kingdom, 1999, 2011, 2013; Logvinenko,
1999; Adelson, 2000; Logvinenko and Ross, 2005; Bressan, 2006;
Gilchrist, 2006; Anderson and Winawer, 2008; Radonjic et al.,
2010; Radonjic and Gilchrist, 2013). Helmholtz’s ideas are also
echoed by proponents of the “empirical” approach that replaces
“unconscious inference” with the idea that percepts arise in
proportion to their respective frequencies of occurrence in the
past experiences of both the species and the individual observer
(Purves et al., 2004).
Proposal of a Common Theoretical
Framework for Lightness and Brightness
Perception
In a recent review of the brightness/lightness literature King-
dom (2011) noted that “Divided into different camps, each
with its own preferred stimuli, methodology and theory, the
study of LBT (lightness, brightness, transparency) is sometimes
more reminiscent of the social sciences with its deep ideologi-
cal divides than it is of the neurosciences.” We describe a data-
driven theoretical framework for lightness/brightness research
that resolves many of the definitional and theoretical confu-
sions that have plagued communication between the various
groups and impeded progress in the field. The proposed frame-
work is based on two testable explanatory concepts. The first is
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the idea that much of the debate and confusion in the bright-
ness/lightness literature stems from the fact that the term light-
ness, defined as apparent reflectance, is underspecified with
regard to illumination and thus, due to the inverse problem, is
often inadvertently used to refer to three very different and inde-
pendent types of judgments that are not comparable (Blakeslee
et al., 2008; Blakeslee and McCourt, 2012). Experimental sup-
port for this idea is provided by the data of Arend and Spehar
(1993a,b); and Blakeslee et al. (2008). These studies demonstrate
that under stimulus conditions where there is a visible illumi-
nation component (e.g., a shadow, transparency, or spotlight)
observers can distinguish and match three independent dimen-
sions of achromatic experience: apparent intensity (brightness),
apparent local intensity ratio (brightness-contrast), and appar-
ent reflectance (lightness). In the absence of a visible illumina-
tion component, however, achromatic visual experience reduces
to two dimensions and, depending on stimulus conditions and
observer instructions, judgments of apparent reflectance (light-
ness) are identical to judgments of apparent intensity (bright-
ness) or apparent local intensity ratio (brightness-contrast).
The second novel but closely related concept is that because
apparent reflectance (lightness) judgments are based on differ-
ent task-dependent information under different stimulus and/or
instruction conditions, they can differ greatly in their degree of
difficulty (Blakeslee andMcCourt, 2012). This idea has the poten-
tial to explain the large variability in the accuracy of lightness
judgments (i.e., the degree of “lightness constancy”) observed
across studies (Gilchrist, 2006; Kingdom, 2011, 2013).
Definitional Confusions
As a first step toward the goal of building a common frame-
work within which to advance the lightness/brightness literature,
it is critical to understand the differences and confusions in the
field that are related to terminology and to establish a common
vocabulary (Blakeslee et al., 2008; Blakeslee and McCourt, 2012;
McCann et al., 2014). These terminological differences are seri-
ous because they obscure both the fundamental nature of the
inverse problem as well as the mechanisms the visual system
employs to solve it. While we limit our discussion to the terms
(and their definitions) that are most commonly encountered in
the current literature to describe the psychological correlates of
the three physical stimulus dimensions of intensity, reflectance,
and illumination, other terms and definitions are also encoun-
tered sporadically in the literature, and care must be taken to
translate the meanings of these terms into a common language.
The Commission Internationale de L’Eclairage (CIE, 1970)
defines the term brightness as the attribute of a visual sensation
according to which a given visual stimulus appears to be more
or less intense, or according to which the area in which a visual
stimulus is presented appears to emitmore or less light (Wyszecki
and Stiles, 1982; Wyszecki, 1986). Lightness, on the other hand, is
defined (CIE, 1970) as the attribute of a visual sensation accord-
ing to which the area occupied by the visual stimulus appears to
emit more or less light in proportion to that emitted by a simi-
larly illuminated area perceived as a “white” stimulus (Wyszecki
and Stiles, 1982; Wyszecki, 1986). In describing the appearance
of light (here restricted to a discussion of achromatic colors), the
distinction between unrelated and related colors is also informa-
tive. According to Pokorny et al. (1991) unrelated colors refer to
stimuli presented alone in a dark field or alternatively that fill
the entire visual field (ganzfeld). Unrelated colors vary only in
apparent intensity (brightness). Related colors, on the other hand,
are those that are presented with other colors and have both an
apparent intensity (brightness) and an apparent intensity relative
to a similarly illuminated area perceived as a “white” stimulus
(lightness). In other words, the dimension of lightness emerges
only in relation to other colors.
Although the CIE definitions of brightness and lightness are
still used, it has becomemore common in the recent psychophys-
ical literature to use the definitions first suggested by a small
group of researchers known as the Trieste group (Arend, 1993),
who defined brightness as apparent luminance and lightness as
apparent reflectance. Although the CIE and Trieste group defi-
nitions of brightness appear very similar (luminance after all is
a photometric measure of physical intensity), it is worth noting
that this term has come to be used quite differently by vari-
ous research groups. For example, research groups focused on
the elucidation of “low-level” mechanisms tend to be interested
in brightness (apparent intensity) in general, and in brightness
illusions in particular, because these phenomena are thought to
result from (and therefore reveal the nature of) early neural pro-
cesses such as photoreceptor light adaptation, retinal and early
cortical luminance and contrast gain control, and spatial and
temporal filtering by retinal, LGN, and early cortical receptive
fields. In other words, brightness refers to an appearance-based
percept that is the outcome of significant early processing by the
visual system. These researchers would certainly agree with the
long held assertion that although brightness (apparent intensity)
is highly correlated with the physical stimulus intensity (lumi-
nance) for stimuli presented alone in a dark field (i.e., unre-
lated stimuli), it is nonetheless highly dependent on context for
stimuli presented in a display containing multiple stimuli (i.e.,
related stimuli), and may differ greatly from photometric lumi-
nance (Wyszecki and Stiles, 1982; Wyszecki, 1986; Pokorny et al.,
1991; Kingdom, 2011). Groups seeking explanations based on
“higher-level” processes, on the other hand, tend to be interested
in lightness (apparent reflectance) and, to the extent that they
are concerned with neural mechanisms at all, focus on processes
that support contrast coding. Contrast-coding mechanisms are
of interest to these lightness researchers because they perform
the types of computations that are thought to contribute to one
form of “lightness constancy” (i.e., constancy over illumination),
which refers to the ability of an observer to recognize that two
surfaces under different illuminations have the same reflectance.
Note that these contrast-coding mechanisms clearly overlap with
the early neural mechanisms thought to underlie brightness.
Considering that intensity (luminance) and reflectance are per-
fectly correlated for surfaces under homogeneous illumination,
the fact that brightness (apparent intensity) and lightness (appar-
ent reflectance) matching are also highly correlated under these
conditions (Arend and Spehar, 1993a,b; Blakeslee et al., 2008;
Rudd, 2010; Blakeslee and McCourt, 2012) is not surprising,
and suggests a common underlying mechanism. While some
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researchers are comfortable acknowledging this theoretical over-
lap (Kingdom, 2011, 2013), other groups (Gilchrist et al., 1999;
Gilchrist, 2006, 2007) are not, and despite accepting the similar
definition of brightness as apparent luminance, have nonetheless
(mis)interpreted the term “brightness” to mean “the perception of
a proximal quality—the raw intensity of some part of the image”
(Gilchrist, 2006, p. 6). Based on this misunderstanding they argue
that “the human visual system evolved to determine object prop-
erties, like lightness, illumination level, and 3D form, which are
adaptive for survival, not proximal qualities like brightness, which
are not” (Gilchrist, 2006, p. 338). These quotations clearly reveal
that this research group has equated the term brightness with the
raw (unprocessed) intensity distribution incident on the retina.
However, since observers lack access to the unprocessed intensity
distribution (photoreceptor light adaptation, neural luminance
and contrast gain control, and spatial and temporal filtering inter-
vene at the earliest levels of the visual system) this is clearly
a misunderstanding or misrepresentation of the term bright-
ness (apparent intensity) as commonly (and historically) used by
other researchers. As elaborated below, this confusion stems in
part from a failure to appreciate the distinction between situa-
tions where apparent reflectance (lightness) judgments are based
strictly on appearance (and are therefore identical to brightness
or brightness-contrast judgments), vs. when they are based on an
inferential judgment of lightness (i.e., when they are not based
directly on appearance, and are independent of brightness and
brightness-contrast).
Confusion regarding the meaning of the term lightness,
however, is more serious and widespread. The CIE (1970) defi-
nition of lightness (perceived intensity relative to a similarly illu-
minated stimulus perceived as white) is highly correlated with
the physical reflectance of a surface under the specified stim-
ulus condition of similar illumination. Recall that because of
the inverse problem reflectance can only be determined or esti-
mated (correctly or incorrectly) based on either direct knowl-
edge or prior assumptions (conscious or unconscious) about
the illumination of the target surface or object. In other words,
by specifying similar illumination the confounding influence of
reflectance and illumination in determining the retinal inten-
sity distribution (the inverse problem) is resolved. Note, how-
ever, that the specification of “similarly illuminated” also means
that the CIE definition of lightness fails to pertain to other stim-
ulus conditions such as comparisons between shadowed and
un-shadowed regions. The definition of lightness as apparent
reflectance (Arend, 1993), however, is also problematic since
it ignores the inverse problem completely by referring directly
to a physical property of the stimulus, its reflectance, with-
out further qualification regarding the illumination. As men-
tioned previously, the data of Arend and Spehar (1993a,b) and
Blakeslee et al. (2008), demonstrate that lightness, defined sim-
ply as apparent reflectance, is under-specified and may refer to
three very different types of judgments. Under stimulus con-
ditions where there is a visible illumination component (e.g.,
a shadow, transparency, or spotlight) observers can distinguish
and match three independent dimensions of achromatic expe-
rience: apparent intensity (brightness), apparent local intensity
ratio (brightness-contrast), and apparent reflectance (lightness).
In the absence of a visible illumination edge, however, achromatic
visual experience is reduced to two dimensions and, depend-
ing on stimulus conditions and observer instructions, judgments
of apparent reflectance (lightness) are identical to judgments of
apparent intensity (brightness) or apparent local intensity ratio
(brightness-contrast) (see also Rudd (2010) for partial confirma-
tion of these results). The terms inferred-lightness (Blakeslee and
McCourt, 2003; Blakeslee et al., 2008) and projective-lightness
(Reeves et al., 2008) have been introduced to distinguish light-
ness judgments where the illumination component in a scene
(such as a shadow or spot-lit region) has been taken into account,
and the lightness judgment is therefore not directly based on the
appearance of the region or object to be judged, but is instead an
estimate of how that region or object would appear when not in
shadow or spot-light. Note that this type of lightness judgment
requires that the observer first estimate the illumination com-
ponent in the scene. This is possible, however, only when the
illumination component is clearly visible allowing the observer
to compare the brightness information (brightness-contrast) on
either side of the illumination boundary (as it crosses objects or
surfaces in the scene) to determine its magnitude. As discussed
in more detail below, Blakeslee and McCourt (2012) suggest that
inferred-lightness judgments can vary greatly in their difficulty
ranging from easy (seemingly automatic) to difficult (requiring
focused effort).
How Confusion of the Three Types of
Lightness Judgments Has Distorted the
Literature: Examples
It is critically important to understand that judgments of
inferred-lightness, made possible (and optimal) by the exis-
tence of a visible illumination component, are entirely different
from the appearance-based (and optimal) judgments of apparent
reflectance (lightness) that are identical to judgments of apparent
intensity (brightness) under conditions of homogeneous illumi-
nation, and to apparent local intensity ratio (brightness-contrast)
under conditions where illumination varies over time (or space)
but no information from a visible illumination boundary is avail-
able. Blakeslee et al. (2008) and Blakeslee and McCourt (2012)
argued that a failure to make this vital distinction is responsible
for a great deal of the current confusion and division in the field.
The three types of lightness judgments are in fact not comparable
but are frequently unwittingly conflated due to the underspecified
definition of lightness as apparent reflectance. This confusion is
compounded by the inconsistent recognition by observers, and
often experimenters as well, of the type of information on which
their lightness judgments are based, and of when an independent
dimension of inferred-lightness is actually available for matching.
This is especially important to be aware of when comparing the
results of studies involving Munsell paper displays and matching
arrays with studies using electronic stimuli and matching proce-
dures. For example, Munsell matching to an array of papers rang-
ing from black to white is common practice in lightness research
and, like luminance matching in brightness research, may index
any one of the three types of lightness judgments depending on
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the matching conditions. If the matching chips and stimulus dis-
play are homogeneously illuminated at the same level, then opti-
mal lightness matching would be equivalent to brightness (i.e.,
apparent intensity) matching. More common in paper matching
studies, however, has been the practice of using a different illumi-
nation level on the matching chips. This procedure makes some
form of brightness-contrast or comparison matching (not neces-
sarily between adjacent regions) optimal for lightness matching.
In the presence of a visible illumination, however, the optimal
lightness match to a location within the shadow or spotlight is an
inferential-lightness match.
Blakeslee et al. (2008) and Blakeslee and McCourt (2012)
investigated this issue with regard to a history of data on simul-
taneous contrast, in which discrepancies in the magnitude and
direction of the reported lightness effects appeared, in some
instances, to be directly the result of comparing disparate types
of lightness judgments, i.e., those based on appearance (and the
same as brightness or brightness-contrast) with those based on
inference (Gilchrist, 1979, 1988; Gilchrist et al., 1983) and, in
other instances, to observers erroneously judging brightness or
brightness-contrast rather than the available and independent
dimension of inferred- (projective-) lightness (Gilchrist et al.,
1999; Gilchrist, 2006). For example, Gilchrist (Gilchrist, 1979;
Gilchrist et al., 1983) produced several variants of the classic
simultaneous contrast stimulus by using illumination rather than
reflectance differences to produce the different backgrounds.
Gilchrist and colleagues reported that a mid-gray background
was made to appear white on one side and black on the other
by illuminating half of the background such that it was 30 times
more luminous than the shadowed half (thus mimicking the 30:1
intensity ratio of white vs. black paper under homogeneous illu-
mination). Likewise, in order to equate the luminances of the
target stimuli, as in the classic simultaneous contrast display, the
target on the illuminated side was made of black paper, such
that it reflected 30 times less light than a white paper target on
the shadowed side. In this way, these studies claimed to repro-
duce the retinal light intensities that would result from viewing
a reflectance-based simultaneous contrast stimulus (i.e., equilu-
minant mid-gray targets on black and white backgrounds) under
homogeneous illumination. When this illumination-edge stim-
ulus was viewed through a rectangular aperture that masked
everything but the targets and their near backgrounds (Gilchrist,
1979), or in a manner that obscured the actual illumination con-
ditions (Gilchrist et al., 1983), the display was reported to look
like a standard simultaneous contrast display. Under these con-
ditions the authors state that observers described the illumination
edge as a reflectance edge between black and white backgrounds
and matched the lightness of the targets to mid-gray (the one
on the bright background slightly darker than the one on the
dark background due to brightness induction). However, when
observers viewed the display without the aperture (Gilchrist,
1979), or when an additional background was inserted which
revealed the illumination so that observers could clearly see and
describe the differential illumination on the two halves of the
stimulus (Gilchrist et al., 1983), they matched the lightness of the
illuminated target to black and the lightness of the shadowed tar-
get to white. Thus, the lightness (apparent reflectance) of the two
targets was reported to be profoundly different in this condition
even though the intensity of light coming from each target and
near background remained the same. Gilchrist (Gilchrist, 1979;
Gilchrist et al., 1983) interpreted this result as evidence that, when
given enough information, the visual system can classify edges
into those due to illumination vs. those due to reflectance prior
to integrating the reflectance edges to determine the reflectance
of various regions.
Based on these reports and on several subsequent studies
(Arend and Goldstein, 1987; Schirillo et al., 1990; Arend and Spe-
har, 1993a,b; Blakeslee et al., 2008) investigated the possibility
that two different types of lightness judgments were being erro-
neously compared in the Gilchrist experiments. Blakeslee et al.
(2008) measured apparent intensity (brightness), brightness-
contrast, and apparent reflectance (lightness) in simultaneous
contrast stimuli that were produced by rendering in a virtual real-
ity environment, and by using calibrated neutral value Munsell
papers (matte) and projected light. The results from these stud-
ies indicated that when illumination appeared homogeneous, or
when observers were instructed that illumination was homoge-
neous (for example, see Figure 1A), observer brightness matches
were identical to their lightnessmatches. Under conditions where
an illumination edge was clearly visible, however, (for example,
see Figure 1B) although observer brightness matches remained
similar to those in the homogeneous illumination condition,
their lightness matches differed significantly from their bright-
ness matches. In other words, under these conditions subjects
were able to make independent inferred-lightness judgments.
On the basis of these findings Blakeslee et al. (2008) concluded
that the profound lightness effects reported to be produced by
the type of background edge in the earlier Gilchrist experiments
(Gilchrist, 1979, 1988; Gilchrist et al., 1983) were likely due to
two different stimulus dimensions being matched in the two con-
ditions. That is, subjects matched lightness using apparent inten-
sity (brightness) or brightness-contrast (depending on the illu-
mination conditions for the matching chips) in the reflectance
edge condition, but used the independent dimension of inferred-
lightness in the condition where an illumination edge was clearly
visible. In other words, it is clear from the results of Blakeslee
et al. (2008) that although the inferred-lightnesses of the test
patches in the visible-illumination condition were matched to
black and white in the original Gilchrist experiments, they would
not, as is usually assumed [for example see Kingdom (2003), p.
25; and Kingdom (2011), p. 662], have actually appeared black
and white. Thus, what was reported as a profound lightness effect,
and is assumed to be directly based on appearance by many
investigators, is actually a confusion resulting from comparing
a direct appearance-based judgment of lightness with an indirect
inferential lightness judgment.
Interestingly, Gilchrist reported quite different results in later
experiments designed to test the intrinsic image model described
above against his newer anchoring model (Gilchrist et al., 1999;
Gilchrist, 2006). In these experiments, which we refer to as
“unequal-increment” experiments, a dark-gray target square was
centered on one side, and a white target square was centered
on the other side, of a black rectangular background. Follow-
ing the application (to the half of the background containing
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the dark-gray target) of a clearly visible illumination component
(spotlight) of sufficient intensity to make the dark-gray target
within the spotlight possess the highest luminance, the dark-
gray target was reported to be judged as significantly lighter
than the white target outside the spotlight. Gilchrist (Gilchrist
et al., 1999; Gilchrist, 2006) pointed out that this result was
exactly opposite to that predicted by the intrinsic image expla-
nation and instead supported his anchoring model of lightness
perception. Note that a model that accounted for the illumi-
nation component in the scene (like the intrinsic image expla-
nation) would predict that the lightness (apparent reflectance)
of the illuminated target would be similar to the target’s actual
reflectance (i.e., dark-gray), and likewise for the lightness of the
target outside the spotlight (i.e., white) (Gilchrist et al., 1999;
Gilchrist, 2006). The anchoring model, on the other hand, pre-
dicts that the lightness of the dark-gray target in the spotlight
will be matched to white because it is the highest luminance
in its local framework, as well as in the global framework. The
lightness of the white target outside the spotlight is predicted
to be matched to light middle-gray because, although it is the
highest luminance in its local framework, it is not the high-
est luminance in the global framework (Gilchrist et al., 1999;
Gilchrist, 2006). Blakeslee et al. (2008) measured brightness and
lightness judgments in this unequal-increment stimulus and con-
cluded, based on their results, that the observers in this later
Gilchrist experiment, when asked to judge lightness (Gilchrist
et al., 1999; Gilchrist, 2006), were instead “erroneously” basing
their judgments on appearance (i.e., brightness or brightness-
contrast), rather than on the available independent dimension
of inferred-lightness. Had inferred-lightness been judged in this
experiment, as it was in the earlier edge-substitution studies,
the opposite conclusion, i.e., support for the intrinsic image
model as opposed to the anchoring model, would have been
reached!
Blakeslee and McCourt (2012) extended the investigation
of brightness (apparent intensity) and lightness (apparent
reflectance) matching to a number of other well-known visual
stimuli that contained a visible illumination component (i.e.,
a shadow or transparent overlay) as well as to their homo-
geneously illuminated control stimuli. These stimuli included:
(1) the Williams et al. (1998) version of the illumination edge
verses reflectance edge simultaneous contrast illusion (Figure 2)
(Gilchrist et al., 1983;Williams et al., 1998; Purves et al., 2004); (2)
the snake illusion (Figure 3) (Somers and Adelson, 1997; Adel-
son, 2000); (3) a paint/transparency/shadow checkerboard illu-
sion derived from Adelson’s checkershadow illusion (Adelson,
1995); (4) the paint/shadow illusion (Hillis and Brainard, 2007);
(5) the argyle illusion (Adelson, 1993); (6) the wall of blocks
illusion (Adelson, 1993; Logvinenko, 1999); and (7) a Cartier-
Bresson photograph of a natural scene containing shadowed
regions (Figure 4) (similar to the Cartier-Bresson photograph
used by Gilchrist (2006) and Gilchrist and Radonjic (2010). These
stimuli were chosen, in part, because similar to the investigations
of simultaneous contrast discussed above, the previous investi-
gations of these effects also appeared to be confusing brightness
(apparent intensity) and lightness (apparent reflectance) under
the various conditions.
FIGURE 2 | The simultaneous contrast stimulus used by Blakeslee and
McCourt (2012). The stimulus was modeled on the Williams et al. (1998)
version of a reflectance edge (A) and an illumination edge (B) simultaneous
contrast illusion. In (B) the test patches and near backgrounds are identical to
those in (A); however, a dark far surround has been added that causes the left
half of the stimulus to appear to be in shadow. The bar graph plots the mean
(and 95% confidence intervals) of four observers brightness (gray bars) and
lightness (white bars) matches for each test patch within the stimulus displays.
The test patches are labeled from left to right in the order that they appear in
the stimuli. Lightness matches only differed significantly from brightness
matches (green bar) in (B) where the test patch was seen beneath a shadow.
Under these conditions subjects were able to make independent inferred
judgments of lightness.
The significant main effects and interactions associated with
the apparent intensity (brightness) and apparent reflectance
(lightness) matching behavior in the Blakeslee and McCourt
(2012) study confirmed for this important set of stimuli that
while the two types of judgments were not significantly differ-
ent under homogeneous illumination, they differed significantly
when one of the test patches was seen beneath a transparent
overlay or in shadow (noted by green statistical comparison
bars in Figures 2–4). Under these conditions subjects with clear
instructions regarding the difference between brightness and
lightness matching were able to make inferential (Blakeslee and
McCourt, 2003; Blakeslee et al., 2008; Reeves et al., 2008) judg-
ments of lightness by using the information provided by the
brightness-contrast at the visible illumination edge to account
for the shadow or transparency and estimate the reflectance of
the underlying surface. As mentioned previously, Blakeslee and
McCourt (2012) made the additional argument that under some
circumstances inferred-lightness judgments appear to be effort-
less and accurate, for example where a shadow or transparent
overlay falls across only a portion of an object or surface, allow-
ing its apparent reflectance (lightness) to be judged based on
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FIGURE 3 | The snake illusion stimulus used by Blakeslee and McCourt
(2012). The stimulus is modeled on Adelson (2000). The test patches in (A, B)
share the same luminance. In addition, the upper test patches in both stimuli
have the same lower background luminance and the lower test patches share
the same higher background luminance. The stimuli differ in the luminances of
the more distant regions (the snake undulations) such that the upper test
patch in (B) appears to lie beneath a transparent overlay. The bar graph plots
the mean (and 95% confidence intervals) of four observers brightness (gray
bars) and lightness (white bars) matches for each test patch within the
stimulus displays. The test patches are labeled left to right in the order that
they appear in the stimuli. Lightness judgments differed significantly from
brightness judgments (green bar) only for the upper test patch in (B) where the
test patch was seen beneath a transparency. Under this condition subjects
were able to make independent inferred judgments of lightness.
those parts of the object or surface lying outside of the shad-
owed or transparency occluded region. This strategy for judg-
ing inferred-lightness is probably a highly overlearned behavior
and is illustrated in Figure 4 for the area labeled BK2, where
observers were asked to match the apparent reflectance (light-
ness) of a shadowed part of the wall, but where a neighboring
part of the same wall not in shadow is also clearly visible.
Note that the variability of the mean lightness matches across
observers for this region (BK2) is small and comparable to
that for brightness matching. Under other conditions, where
an object or surface is completely shadowed or under a trans-
parent overlay, such that its illumination must be estimated
based on a comparison of brightness-contrast at a remote illu-
mination edge, however, inferential lightness judgments are con-
siderably more effortful and imprecise. This is illustrated in
Figure 4 where observers were asked to match the apparent
reflectance (lightness) of the shadowed equiluminant test fields
labeled TF2, TF3, and TF6. The variability of lightness matches
FIGURE 4 | Cartier-Bresson photograph. An image of the Cartier-Bresson
stimulus used by Blakeslee and McCourt (2012). The test patches are labeled
from left to right (TF1–TF6). In addition, four background regions located below
the test patches were selected for matching and are labeled: BK1, BK2, BK4,
and BK6. The luminance of all of the test patches is identical, however, their
backgrounds differ. The bar graph plots the mean (and 95% confidence
intervals) of four observers brightness (gray bars) and lightness (white bars)
matches for each test patch and background patch within the stimulus.
Lightness matches differed significantly from brightness matches (green bars)
only at locations where the test patch was seen beneath a shadow. Under
these conditions subjects were able to make independent inferred-lightness
judgments.
across observers in this condition is much greater than for BK2.
Although not illustrated in the figures, the within-subjects vari-
ability of the inferred-lightness matches mirrored these between
subject results.
The confusion here is that with the exception of the edge-
substitution experiments discussed earlier (Gilchrist, 1979, 1988;
Gilchrist et al., 1983), previous studies of the illusions inves-
tigated by Blakeslee and McCourt (2012) were all interested
in appearance effects, i.e., the apparent intensity (brightness)
of the target regions and deliberately instructed subjects to
match brightness (apparent intensity). These same studies, how-
ever, discussed and interpreted these illusions using the term
lightness (Adelson, 2000; Logvinenko and Ross, 2005; Gilchrist,
2006; Todorovic, 2006; Hillis and Brainard, 2007; Kingdom,
2011). Clearly this use of terms is justifiable (albeit poten-
tially confusing) under conditions of homogeneous illumination
where apparent intensity (brightness) and apparent reflectance
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(lightness) matching yield the same result. However, refer-
ring to appearance-based brightness judgments as lightness
judgments in the stimuli actually containing a visible illumina-
tion component is a seriously confusing misnomer since inde-
pendent inferred-lightness judgments are in fact possible in these
stimuli. This confusing naming error may have persisted in part
because it has only rarely been the case that both lightness and
brightness have been measured under the same conditions in
the same experiment (Schirillo et al., 1990; Arend and Spe-
har, 1993a,b; Blakeslee et al., 2008; Rudd, 2010; Blakeslee and
McCourt, 2012), and also because as yet there is not a gen-
eral appreciation of when the terms brightness (or brightness-
contrast) and lightness refer to the same or different dimensions
of achromatic experience.
Paradoxically, however, this difference between the dimen-
sion of inferred-lightness and the dimension of brightness is
well accepted for relatively easy inferred-lightness judgments, for
example as discussed above, when a shadow is cast across a sur-
face but where a neighboring part of the same surface not in
shadow is also visible (see Figure 4, area labeled BK2). Indeed, a
stimulus of this type is the textbook illustration of the difference
between lightness and brightness (for example see Palmer, 1999;
Kingdom, 2011). It is ironic, therefore, that this is also a stimu-
lus that the anchoring model of lightness is challenged to explain
(Gilchrist et al., 1999; Gilchrist, 2006; Zdravkovic et al., 2006).
Gilchrist (2006) refers to this particular challenge as the “response
paradox” and writes, “when an obvious cast illuminance edge
crosses a region of homogeneous reflectance, an intractable ambi-
guity is produced in the data, if not the percept itself. Observers
report that the lightness is the same on both sides of the illumi-
nance edge, but when asked to make matches from a Munsell
chart, all of the same observers assign different numbers to the two
sides. This cannot be dismissed as confusion between lightness and
brightness: expert observers show the same paradox.” The problem
for the anchoring model is that local anchoring within illumina-
tion frames predicts two values for the lightness of the object,
one for the part of the object (patch) in the brighter illumina-
tion and one for the part of the object (patch) in the dimmer
illumination. Zdravkovic et al. (2006) conducted a number of
experiments to study the relationship between patchmatches and
whole object matches. They concluded that the object match rep-
resented a compromise between the match for the patch in the
field of highest illumination and the patch in the largest field of
illumination, and proposed that these new rules be applied as
an extension to the anchoring model but only for the case of
multi-lit patches. A close examination of these results, however,
makes it clear that the “response paradox” is easily and parsimo-
niously resolved by using the framework we propose. In other
words, what are being called the “lightness” matches to the parts
of the objects (patches) under the two different levels of illumi-
nation are direct appearance-based matches (i.e., brightness or
brightness-contrast matches depending on the matching condi-
tions). The “lightness” matches made for the whole object, how-
ever, are based on inferred-lightness. In other words, the object
in this instance, by definition, has a single reflectance value but
two regions of very different brightness (apparent intensity) due
to the unequal levels of illumination. The new rules proposed to
rescue the anchoring model in the case of multi-lit patches, in
essence, describe which region is seen as shadowed or spot-lit as
opposed to “normally-lit” and thereby inform something akin to
an inferred-lightness judgment for the whole object.
Similar confusion resulting from a lack of distinction between
lightness judgments based directly on appearance (i.e., that are
the same as brightness or brightness-contrast), and those based
on inferred-lightness, is also contaminating recent work re-
examining the effect of depth on lightness (Radonjic et al., 2010;
Radonjic and Gilchrist, 2013). The stimuli employed in these
studies are variants of the perpendicular planes stimuli used in
earlier studies by Gilchrist (1977, 1980) and purport to extend
his previous work showing a large effect of perceived illumi-
nation (manipulated by the perceived depth of the target) on
lightness judgments under conditions in which the surround of
the target remains the same. Although the stimuli are different,
the logic of these experiments is similar to the reflectance vs.
illumination edge simultaneous contrast experiments discussed
earlier. Here, however, perceived depth is manipulated to make
the target appear to be in one of two different spatial positions
and therefore part of an illuminated (spot-lit) or non-illuminated
(shadowed) region of the display (Figure 5). Briefly, observers
viewed what appeared to be a cube oriented such that a ver-
tical right angle pointed toward the observer. The left side of
the cube was covered with black paper and the right side of the
cube was covered with white paper. Extending from the cor-
ner was an upper and a lower trapezoidal shaped target. The
upper target (covered with black paper) extended from the white
side of the cube such that it was seen against the black side of
the cube. The lower target (covered with white paper) extended
from the black side of the cube such that it was seen against the
white side of the cube. In addition, the display was lit from the
right such that the white side of the cube and the black target
extending from it were highly illuminated, while the black side
of the display and the white target extending from it were shad-
owed and therefore dimly illuminated. Importantly, this illumi-
nation was adjusted so that the upper (black) target and the lower
(white) target were actually equiluminant. When viewed binoc-
ularly (as depicted in Figure 5A) the targets were seen veridi-
cally in depth and therefore also in illumination. When viewed
monocularly, however, (as depicted in Figure 5B) the targets
appeared to switch planes (due to a loss of depth information)
and therefore also switched their apparent illumination. In the
binocular (veridical illumination) condition the mean Munsell
match to the upper (black and illuminated) target was close to
black (mean Munsell value = 2.85; black =Munsell 2.0) and the
lower (white and non-illuminated) target was matched to light
gray (mean Munsell value = 7.6). In the monocular condition,
however, the upper (black and illuminated) target, now seen as
lying on top of the black and non-illuminated side of the cube,
was matched to middle gray (mean Munsell value = 5.2) and
the lower (white and non-illuminated) target, now seen as lying
on top of the illuminated white side of the display, was matched
to dark gray (mean Munsell value = 3.6). We again suggest that
the lightness matches in the binocular conditions were based on
inferred-lightness while those in the monocular conditions were
based directly on appearance (i.e., were the same as judgments
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FIGURE 5 | Illustration depicting the stimulus configuration employed
by Radonjic et al. (2010) and Radonjic and Gilchrist (2013) to reexamine
the effect of depth on lightness matching. The upper target (covered with
black paper) extended from the white side of the cube such that it was seen
against the black side. The lower target (covered with white paper) extended
from the black side of the cube such that it was seen against the white side.
The display was lit from the right such that the white side of the cube and the
black target extending from it were highly illuminated, while the black side of
the cube and the white target extending from it were shadowed and dimly
illuminated. Illumination was adjusted so that the upper (black) target and the
lower (white) target were equiluminant. When viewed binocularly (A) the
targets were seen veridically in depth and therefore also in illumination. When
viewed monocularly, however, [as depicted in (B)] the targets appeared to
switch depth planes (due to a loss of depth information) and therefore also
switched their perceived illumination.
of brightness or brightness-contrast) and would have remained
the same across conditions. We can be reasonably confident
of this interpretation because, despite the lack of brightness or
brightness-contrast matching data, observers in both of these
studies (Radonjic et al., 2010; Radonjic and Gilchrist, 2013) were
informed as to the differences between lightness and brightness
and instructed specifically to make lightness matches, “to pick
the chip from the chart that is the same actual color as the target;
that is, cut from the same piece of paper as the target.” In addi-
tion, observer matches were reported to be excluded from the
analysis if: (1) the observer failed to perceive the intended spa-
tial position of the targets when questioned as to the appearance
of the display; (2) during debriefing it was established that the
observer was making brightness and not lightness matches (e.g.,
“I saw the target as white, but it appeared darker; I matched how
it appeared”); and (3) the matches fell more than three standard
deviations above or below the mean of the whole group in a given
condition.
Summary
We have presented, and provided data to support, a framework
for lightness and brightness research that resolves confusions
and paradoxes in the literature, and provides insight into the
mechanisms the visual system employs to tackle the inverse
problem. The main idea is that much of the debate and confu-
sion in the literature stems from the fact that lightness, defined
as apparent reflectance, is underspecified with regard to illu-
mination and thus, due to the inverse problem, is often used
to refer to three very different and independent types of judg-
ments that are not comparable. Experimental support for this
idea is provided by the data of Arend and Spehar (1993a,b) and
Blakeslee et al. (2008). These studies demonstrated that under
stimulus conditions containing a visible illumination compo-
nent, such as a shadow boundary, observers can distinguish and
match three independent dimensions of achromatic experience:
apparent intensity (brightness), apparent local intensity ratio
(brightness-contrast), and apparent reflectance (lightness). In the
absence of a visible illumination boundary, however, achromatic
vision reduces to two dimensions and, depending on stimulus
conditions and observer instructions, judgments of lightness are
identical to judgments of brightness or brightness-contrast. Due
to the inverse problem, employing the optimal strategy to judge
reflectance depends on the observer having some knowledge of
(or assumptions about) the illumination. While it is clear that
observers are capable of making optimal judgments of lightness
when specifically instructed to do so under laboratory condi-
tions (Arend and Spehar, 1993a,b; Blakeslee et al., 2008; Blakeslee
and McCourt, 2012), it is unclear to what extent these opti-
mal strategies are employed in other laboratories or in natural
vision. Furthermore, because optimal lightness judgments are
based on different information under the various illumination
conditions, they can vary in their degree of difficulty and in their
accuracy. Consideration of these factors may, in part, explain
the large variability in the reported accuracy of lightness judg-
ments (i.e., the degree of lightness constancy) observed across
studies.
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